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Abstract  
In a period of economic and legitimacy crises for firms, there is a current appeal on 
alternative firms to the conventional capitalist and hierarchical one, especially ones 
with a democratic form such as cooperatives. But for a long time the "degeneration" 
pattern of democratic firms, namely their economic failure or the abandonment of 
democratic functioning, has been pointed out. Even if such a deterministic rationale 
has been contested, the main difficulty for democratic firms remains their capacity to 
overcome degeneration crises.  
This paper investigates this question through the case of a 400-member democratic 
professional service firm, studied during three years with an intervention research 
method. It shows how such a firm designed organizational outcomes to a twofold 
crisis of performance and governance. It contributes to a better understanding of the 
conditions of sustainability of democratic firms by emphasizing the possibility of 
designing new models of cooperation, which integrate various constraints and do not 
compromise between antagonist logics within the firm. 
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"The activity of co-creating is the core of democracy"  
(Mary Parker Follett, Creative experience, 1924:302) 
 
Introduction 
In a period of financial, economic and legitimacy crises for firms, there is a current 
appeal for alternative forms of firms to the conventional capitalist and hierarchical 
one. Corporate democracy is a recurrent candidate to such alternatives. For 
example, there has been lately a peak of interest in cooperatives in newspapers and 
an on-going renewed research interest in such democratic governance (eg.Almeida, 
Mello et al. 2012; Bachet 2012; Datta and Gailey 2012). However, there is an 
associated risk of arising as much hopes of change as creating future deception if the 
ambition and the place of such firms in the overall business landscape are not well 
characterized.  
An historical perspective offers several examples of periods of high criticisms of the 
relation between work/corporation and society since the early 19th century. For 
example1, the 1830-50s period was the first period of cooperatives: groups that stood 
long were few and circumscribed to qualified trades (former guilds) (eg. Desroche 
1976; Bate and Carter 1986). A more recent period was the 1960-70s period, a high 
peak of societal contestation during which corporate democracy was a central 
perspective (see for example Slater and Bennis 1969). Self-management aroused at 
that time and was popular in France (Rosanvallon 1976). But once again, 
                                            
1
 The periodization is schematic, each national social history has local dynamics. For a quick survey in 
Great-Britain see the work of Bate, P. and N. Carter (1986). "The future for producers' co-operatives." 
Industrial Relations Journal 17(1): 57-70. 
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disappointment was associated with a lot of failed experiences (Meister 1984). Then 
a specific issue consists in the sustainability of democratic firms over time, namely  
the capacity to combine business and social performance with a democratic 
functioning.   
This issue has been at the heart of research debates on democratic corporations 
since the late 19th century. On the one hand, defenders of the "degeneration" thesis, 
namely their economic deficiency or the giving up of democratic functioning, have 
pointed out their inevitable failure (Webb and Webb 1897; Michels 1949 [1911]; 
Meister 1984). On the other hand, more recent studies have criticized the 
degeneration thesis and argued that if degeneration processes regularly occur, 
possibilities of regeneration exist (Stryjan 1989; Stryjan 1994; Cornforth 1995).  
Then the main difficulty for democratic firms remains their capacity to overcome 
degeneration crises and to regenerate. This paper seeks to extend existing 
knowledge on regeneration processes through the study of a 400-member 
democratic professional service firm, studied during three years with an intervention 
research method. It examines how this firm designed organizational outcomes to a 
twofold crisis of performance and governance. It offers a better understanding of the 
conditions of sustainability of democratic firms. It shows how regeneration processes 
can be designed as the elaboration of new models of cooperation and not only 
compromises between antagonist logics within the firm. 
The rest of the paper is organized as follows: in a first section, the literature review 
on the degeneration/regeneration processes in democratic firms frames the 
challenges associated to their sustainability. We then present the research settings 
and the method designed to investigate the processes of regeneration in a 
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democratic professional service firm. The following section presents the findings on 
degeneration and regeneration processes in the firm. The last section discusses 
theoretical and managerial implications of our study. 
 
1. Challenges to the sustainability of democratic firms 
What are democratic firms? 
There is a difficulty in framing the category of democratic firms. Co-operatives are 
often presented as the model of democratic firm (Hernandez 2006). But then the 
definition is based on the legal form of the firm and not on a "mode of organization" 
(Stryjan 1989). Democratic firms comprehend but are not limited to co-operatives. 
Some firms have developed democratic functioning from a conventional corporation 
framework through internal specific devices (de Jong and van Witteloostuijn 2004) 
and should not be excluded. The term "democratic labor-managed firms" (Luhman 
2006) or "democratic member-owned firms" (Spear 2004) or "self-management" 
(Stryjan 1989) have also been used.  
All these terms are linked together with the will to represent alternatives to 
conventional firms. The latter have developed two features over the modern industrial 
history: first the governance is determined by the capital owners; second the work 
and the overall business is organized through hierarchical management (Gand and 
Béjean 2007). Democratic firms' initiatives usually defend a more or less 
comprehensive rejection of such features. They differentiate themselves from 
"democratization" projects, which aim at rebalancing power within conventional firms. 
The introduction of employees on boards is a "democratization" initiative at the 
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governance level (Kaufman 2000), whereas autonomous teams or empowerment 
experiences are examples of attempts to reform the organization of work (Müller-
Jentsch 1995; Argyris 1998). 
Distinguishing features of democratic firms then lie in the will and the attempt to 
organize democratically. This means an involvement, direct or indirect, of members 
in the running and in the governance of their firm. Democratic firm's projects take 
diverse organizational embodiments due to the necessary adaptation to the activity 
and to business constraints (Mintzberg 1983; Warhurst 1998). 
 
The degeneration thesis and its limits 
The possibility to organize long-standing democratic organizations has been 
contested by several major authors in the studies of organizational democracy (Webb 
and Webb 1897; Michels 1949 [1911]; Meister 1984). These approaches have been 
gathered under the label  "degeneration" thesis (Stryjan 1983). The main argument 
can be summarized in the following quotation: “All such democracies of producers - 
either fail or cease to be democracies of producers” (Webb & Webb, 1920, cited by 
Rosner 1985). The degeneration thesis states that any democratic organization 
eventually fails either due to an un-sufficient economic performance or to a 
conversion to conventional organizing. The balance and the articulation between 
economic and democratic goals would be impossible to sustain.  
Degeneration driven by poor business performance is associated with a narrow 
conception of organizational democracy as direct participation and collective 
management. In such cases, management functions are impossible to design and 
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legitimate (Pendleton 2001). The organization of "ultra-democracy" (Viggiani 1999) is 
usually not compatible with firms' constraints in most industries.  
Degeneration driven by giving-up democratic functioning takes the form of a return to 
a conventional organizational form, or the move towards formal democracy, or 
towards an oligarchic functioning. There is a particular tension around management 
functions that represent pivotal but contested roles in such settings (Gospel and 
Pendleton 2006). The emergence of a managerial elite opens the door to oligarchic 
evolutions (Michels 1949 [1911]; Hernandez 2006), whereas needs of managerial 
competences may be a matter of business survival (Pendleton 2001).  
Beyond internal factors, the role of institutional, political and economic environment 
has been recognized as constraining, and sometimes determinant (Simons and 
Ingram 2003; Warhurst and Darr 2006). In this perspective, the degeneration process 
would be linked to 'isomorphic' pressures (DiMaggio and Powell 1983) in the 
business field of the firm.  
 
This deterministic rationale has long been dominant over the field of research, even 
among defenders of organizational democracy (Michels 1949 [1911]; Meister 1984) 
who might have had a rather "romantic" and "idealistic" vision of democracy (Scaff 
1981). The latter was a critic of Max Weber to Roberto Michels on his study of the 
German Social-Democrat Party: such a vision hinders from looking at organizational 
democracy as an "historical system".  
But the degeneration thesis has been contested empirically and theoretically. First, 
there was an empirical inconsistency as soon as there were examples of democratic 
firms that managed to adapt and sustain over time. Israeli kibbutzim created in the 
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1930s2 and a lot during the 1950s were still existing and some had developed  
dramatically over time, even if a general crisis happened in the 1980s. A series of 
work have studied this (eg. Billis 1977; Leviatan 1978; Stryjan 1983; Rosner 1985; 
Simons and Ingram 1997; Warhurst 1998; Simons and Ingram 2003). Examples of 
long-standing successful co-operatives have also empirically contested a too 
deterministic approach to the sustainability of democratic firms (Desroche 1976; 
Cornforth 1983; Sainsaulieu, Tixier et al. 1983; Demoustier 1984; Rosner 1985; Bate 
and Carter 1986; Hunt 1992; Stryjan 1994).  
Second, and in relation to the empirical existence of long-standing democratic firms, 
theoretical criticisms focused on the overly deterministic vision of the degeneration 
thesis' proponents (Sainsaulieu, Tixier et al. 1983; Stryjan 1983; Demoustier 1984; 
Laville and Mahiou 1984). They claim that organizations are never condemned and 
that they have at least some room for maneuver. If all organizations cannot be 
democratic and if their sustainability requires certain conditions, it cannot be 
presupposed that all are unviable (Stryjan 1989). As long as one is not in a 
determinist epistemology, there is no fate for social facts and actors play a role on 
the future of their organizations (Boudon 1981; Giddens 1984; Hatchuel 2005). 
 
1.3. Conceptualizing regeneration processes in democratic firms 
The dominant approach to conceptualizing regeneration processes in democratic 
firms emerged in the specialized research works described above. While 
acknowledging the potential threat of degeneration phases, scholars of this stream of 
                                            
2
 The first one, Degania, was established in 1910 Simons, T. and P. Ingram (2003). "Enemies of the 
State: The Interdependence of Institutional Forms and the Ecology of the Kibbutz, 1910–1997." 
Administrative Science Quaterly 48: 592-621. 
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research have tended to conceptualized ways in which democratic firms can engage 
in regeneration phases through innovation and adaptation processes to new 
circumstances, constraints and capabilities (Cornforth 1983). The epistemological 
position is that organizations are never purely constrained by their environment and 
can struggle against isomorphism pressures (DiMaggio and Powell 1983). They can 
develop what Stryjan called "coping strategies" (Stryjan 1983), namely organized 
action to overcome the degeneration process.  
Stryjan and Cornforth have both produced elaborated works on patterns of 
regeneration (Stryjan 1989; Stryjan 1994; Cornforth 1995). Stryjan proposed a 
theoretical framework based on Giddens' theory of structuration and his concept of 
reproduction (Giddens 1984). He developed a theory of reproduction in which the 
core element is membership as a way to articulate individuals and collective action. 
According to Stryjan, a degeneration is "a flaw of reproduction" (Stryjan 1989). He 
then insists on the importance of members' continuous commitment, especially 
through adapted policies of recruitment and socialization. Cornforth adds a specific 
attention to structures of management and the division of labor as necessitating 
regular regeneration and specific design (Cornforth 1995).  
The main issues appear to be the management of contradictions between possibly 
contradictory goals (Varman and Chakrabarti 2004; Hernandez 2006), which have 
also been approached under the theme of paradoxes (Westenholz 1999). An 
alternative way of conceptualizing regeneration processes is to consider these firms 
as “hybrid organizations.” Recent approaches with a neo-institutional lens have thus 
focused on the capacity of alternative organizations to "hybridize" and treat different 
institutional logics (Battilana and Dorado 2010; Pache and Santos 2010). We 
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examine the interest and limits of this approach in the discussion section of this 
paper. 
In a period of renewed interest for corporate democracy, the aim of this paper is to 
contribute to the understanding and the theorization of regeneration processes in 
democratic firms. We draw on a case-study of a consulting firm of 400 members. It 
offers an original perspective on the regeneration issue since most empirical studies 
have presented rather small structures and rather simple professional activities: 
groceries, bicycle repairing, farm cooperatives, etc (eg. Cornforth 1995; Viggiani 
1997). New experiences develop in a knowledge economy and concern more 
knowledge-intensive work.  
Additionally the origins of degeneration in studied cases lied in growth and/or 
competition. Innovation or competencies transformation were not obvious. In 
contemporary firms, competition by innovation is often the rule, unless such 
democratic firms should stick to restricted industries.  
 
2. Methodology 
Research settings  
Professional organizations have been described as favorable fields for democratic 
functioning since there is a relative homogeneity between professionals compared to 
more industrial businesses (Sainsaulieu, Tixier et al. 1983; Mintzberg 1989; Harrison 
and Freeman 2004). This is re-inforced in a knowledge economy where traditional 
hierarchical mechanisms are not so efficient (Rousseau and Rivero 2003). 
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DemEx3 is a French consultancy with about 400 employees, which provides 
economic expertise and consulting services to French and European works’ councils. 
At its creation in 1971, the founders chose to base the organization on 'self-
management' principles, as a rejection of managerial hierarchy and capitalist 
governance. At that time, self-management was seen as a promising perspective by 
some trade unions and political parties. The corporate form was incorporated due to 
professional regulations, but the owners gave up their rights to the general assembly 
of the members. They was consequently no capital power in the firm. Since then, 
DemEx has been organized democratically, which means that every management 
functions is subject to an election, that different assemblies discuss strategic and 
management issues. Every mandate is limited to two or three times with terms lasting 
two or three years.  
The PSF is structured in seventeen autonomous business units (BU), which deliver 
the service to clients. The members of each unit elect their manager and different 
additional directors according to their needs (recruitment, finance, computing...). At 
the corporate level, a general assembly of the members elects every three years an 
executive board of four managers in charge of running the firm on the basis of a 
voted corporate platform. A supervisory board is elected at the same time.  
 
Intervention research in a democratic consulting firm 
DemEx was studied with a collaborative research approach (Shani, David et al. 
2003). One of the co-authors engaged in an intervention research with the PSF 
                                            
3
 The company name is anonymized.  
 12 
during three years starting from 20054. An intervention research method was 
designed to study this atypical PSF and the issue of sustainability (Hatchuel and 
David 2007; Radaelli, Guerci et al. 2012). Intervention research offers good 
opportunity to reveal the in-depth functioning of organizations. It presents good 
potential to account for developing processes of change by studying action and the 
development of new management models (Radaelli, Guerci et al. 2012).    
The starting point with DemEx was rather blurry and more a symptom than a clear 
definition of issues. It was not expressed at all in a degeneration issue or in a 
democratic management problem. Board managers felt consultants had difficulties in 
managing the evolution of the business and the competencies to deal with. From that 
symptom, which was confirmed with five preliminary interviews with experienced 
consultants and HR managers, a series of three intervention-researches happened 
successively. They progressively revealed, analyzed, and theorized the links 
between competency difficulties, changes in the business demands, new 
organizational devices and a need evolution of democratic regulation in DemEx.  
 
The table 1 synthesizes the topics, the data production and interpretation, and the 
outcomes for each research.  
Table 1. Synthesis of the intervention-researches methods 
 Topic Date Data production and 
interpretation 
Outcomes 
IR 1 Competency March 56 interviews within 4 Diagnosis 
                                            
4
 With two other colleagues 
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crisis? 2005-June 
2006 
business units; readings of 
productions and 
discussion with the 
professionals; internal 
documents (minutes, 
assignments records); 
non-participant 
observation in meetings.  
Data first analysis by 
cross-interpretation from 
the 3 researchers. 
Presentation and 
discussion of analyses in 
each business unit and to 
board managers.  
producing 
organizational 
consensus on the 
causes of the 
difficulties.  
Design of a general 
framework of 
interpretation 
adapted to 
professional works.  
Approach to design 
renewed 
organizational 
models and 
devices.  
IR 2 Organizing 
collective 
knowledge 
management 
November 
2006- 
March 2008 
Participation in a working 
group in a business unit in 
order to design career 
interviews adapted to the 
democratic context. 
Presentation and 
discussion with the whole 
BU's members 
 
Non-participant 
Design and 
experimentation of 
a system of career 
interviews 
 
 
 
 
 
Design of a 
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observation of a one-day 
meeting with directors of 
expertise groups and 
board managers 
Analysis of 4 expertise 
groups; interviews of the 
main contributors; analysis 
and discussion of 
professional production 
(studies); internal 
documents (reporting 
minutes, strategic 
orientations) 
Data first-analysis by 
cross-interpretation. 
Presentation and 
discussion to members of 
expertise groups, and 
large diffusion/discussion.  
legitimate and 
consensual 
organizational 
model for expertise 
groups.  
IR 3 Roots of 
governance 
crisis? 
March – 
September 
2007 
14 interviews with current 
and former board 
managers, business unit's 
managers, HR managers; 
study of a  
written history of DemEx; 
Diagnosis 
producing 
organizational 
consensus on the 
causes of the 
difficulties.  
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40 posts on the Intranet 
forum; written productions 
of the supervisory board.  
Data first analysis by 
cross-interpretation. 
Presentation and 
discussion of analyses to 
the supervisory board and 
to 2 ad-hoc groups 
dedicated to this issues.  
Organizational 
design of a renewed 
governance, which 
has been mainly 
implemented.  
 
The intervention research in DemEx was the research field of a doctoral thesis from 
one of the two co-authors and he completed his research material with a specific 
historical study of the profession from its birth, of DemEx through interviews with 
founders and former members and the study of written historical material (charters, 
minutes...).  
 
3.  Degeneration  and  processes  of  regeneration  of  a  democratic 
consulting firm 
The origins of crises in DemEx 
In the environment of DemEx, trade unions play a particular role since they can 
advise a particular a PSF to works' councils. Distinctive quality matters to 
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demonstrate to clients and prescribers that services are of added-value to 
understand issues and frame their action.  
Since its foundation, DemEx has developed with a traditional model of professional 
apprenticeship. The professionals that are hired have diversified backgrounds: they 
hold degrees between Master’s and doctorate, which can be in various disciplines, 
for instance history, law, economics or management. Attention is paid to the 
commitment of potential recruits to service orientation and to their integration in a 
democratic functioning. Once they are recruited, consultants engage in an 
apprenticeship process, which lasts ca. three years and consists in a mix of training 
sessions and supervised assignments. The aim is to generate fully-autonomous 
consultants. Even if it does not mean consultants then stop learning, this 
representation of the autonomous professional was aligned with the 20 first years of 
DemEx existence: a rather stable environment with enough time to learn individually. 
It was also in line with the tasks and the division of labor: in broad outline, works' 
councils demands were mainly on retrospective analysis in order to prepare wage 
negotiations and work was divided a priori between consultants in four sections of 
expertise (financial analysis, management accounting, strategy and social, social and 
HR analysis). This kind of autonomous professional work is favorable to a democratic 
setting for two reasons. First it fosters the creation of a collective of peers, practicing 
similar works and therefore governing by collegiality. Second, the management of 
DemEx was rather limited to assignments, recruitments and initial apprenticeship. 
The pay system was also aligned with a pay system close to a "earn-what-you-bill" 
logic. Therefore it necessitated less complex organizations compared to more 
coordinated works.  
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Progressively from the 1980s, changes in the demands and the needs of clients 
occurred. Issues raised concerned less wage negotiation and more employment. It 
changed demands from retrospective to prospective analyses. It consequently 
extended the scope of required expertise and obliged to cross different perspectives 
of analysis in order to produce recommendations. At the same time, competition 
increased and there were incentives to demonstrate added-value. It generated a 
progressive obsolescence of the initial work system and initiatives emerged to cope 
with the new challenges. They consisted in non-official specialization through 
assignments and the development of expertise groups. The latter gathered 
professionals involved in specific issues or industries in order to cross their analyses 
over industries in meetings, in order to produce strategic notes out of the 
assignments. In other words, this was a process of emerging knowledge 
management.  
These classical answers in professional settings raised conflicts and arguments on 
the legitimacy and the equity between professionals regarding these practices. There 
was a fear that some professionals would "privatize" clients. For example, the 
conditions of inclusion in an expertise group were not clear. Some industries were 
also more developed and offered better professional interest, work conditions and 
pay perspectives. The limits of a too narrow specialization were also debated, for the 
same reason of "privatization" risk, and for the need of having relatively versatile 
professionals. The democratic basis of initiatives relying on an only professional 
rationale was at stake. Was the democratic functioning about to become "formal" 
through vote procedures or has it to be a more general regulation of organizing? The 
expertise groups were particularly contested since their directors were not elected, 
but at the same time competence was determinant to run such groups. It then 
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appeared difficult to find a trade-off between performance enhancement and 
democratic functioning.   
In parallel, and at first sight non-linked to the competency crisis, a governance crisis 
occurred. Successive elected executive boards resigned before the end of their 
mandates. Different arguments emerged to try to explain the un-sustainability of 
executive functions. In general assemblies, meetings and on the Intranet forum, 
arguments focused on two rationales. The first one focused on the fact that once 
elected, executives tended to organize "oligarch" derives and became more and 
more contested. They consider that a lack of democratic regulation to power 
positions reinforces the difficulty of managing the firm. The other one focused on the 
needed evolution of the organization to meet new challenges, maybe at the expense 
of collegiality. The more important was to recognize the need to adapt the 
organizational structure to business constraints. In this context, organizational 
democracy was maybe un-sustainable and counterproductive to service quality. 
Could democratic governance be compatible with a manageable and competitive 
organizational functioning? 
 
Designing a new model of cooperation 
From previous research and the first intervention research (see table 1. for details), a 
consensus emerged on the need to overcome the existing individualistic organizing 
and to elaborate and legitimate emerging practices in a democratic setting. It took 
three main different ways: career management, expertise groups, and executive 
governance.   
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Career management was previously absent of management, except for initial 
apprenticeship. Short-term assignments were the official rule. An issue was to 
legitimate relative specialization and to embody democratic regulation in it. A system 
of yearly interviews was designed and implemented. Driven by BU's managers, its 
objectives were threefold: working on mid-term assignment policies with an 
articulation between the professional's wishes and the organizational needs; 
contributing to the elaboration of a strategy in nourishing the manager with potential 
development initiatives from the professionals; offering a public, justified and a 
discussable synthesis of assignments choices. The "privatization" issue was then 
managed: the disclosure of assignments' choices embedded in strategic orientations 
opened the door to informed democratic debates in group's meetings, where 
eventually such orientations should be validated.  
The initiative on career management was also needed to develop more efficient and 
legitimate expertise groups. The heterogeneity of expertise groups was 
acknowledged (activities, size), and it was a source of conflict. There was an 
impression of anarchical practices and heterogeneity was perceived as a problem, 
essentially because of the opaqueness of the structures. Behind that lied the need to 
fit such groups in a general democratic regulation. Through multiple analyses (see. 
Intervention-research 2 in Table1.), it was made sense of heterogeneity of actions in 
classifying them and in analyzing a group activity relatively to its specific strategic 
issues. A functional model of the possible contributions of expertise groups helped to 
position and to make sense of differences between them (see figure 1 below). It 
distinguished between:    
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- Production of expertise: this is the core of such group, to develop expertise 
material through a variety of means. The ends of these means were the 
two additional summits of the triangle.  
- Internal knowledge management: it consists in the formalization and the 
diffusion of expertise towards the other consultants to help them to work 
with their clients. It could be through written documents or through direct 
support or intervention on an assignment. 
- and Client's development: these are activities which seek at finding new 
clients, but also to gain the clients' loyalty and to develop on new kinds of 
clients (different from works' councils).  
This framework allowed demanding groups to elaborate and justify local strategy and 
to contribute and inscribe them in a corporate strategy. For instance, a large industry 
expertise group had a lot a clients and recognized expertise development, but only 
gather in few heads. Their strategic priority was then designed as Internal knowledge 
management to develop young promising consultants and then to continue to 
develop on a production of innovative expertise and on new clients. In another 
industry expertise group, much more small in size, the issue was in priority to 
develop on new clients. The basis of clients was fragile and made it difficult to gain 
get time to capitalize and to produce distinctive expertise. The strategy focused on 
such client's development, by asking a development budget to the firm. It opened the 
way to corporate investment policies to develop strategic new expertise and services. 
Overall this clarification helped defined rights and duties for groups, and to design 
non-elected directors. They had to be recognized internally and legitimate in running 
an expertise group. Then they should be validated by the executive board. It means 
that the executive board control and only intervene when a problem arises.  
 21 
 
Figure 1. A functional framework for expertize groups in DemEx 
Debates around executive governance were harsh. Was DemEx unmanageable 
because of the democratic functioning, i.e. elections and debates? The governance 
sources of the crisis appeared to rather be under-structuring regarding size and 
management issues. Executive functions were no longer adapted to growth in size, in 
organization complexity and in management issues over time: more coordination 
interactions with a growing number of structures; evolving demands of important 
external stakeholders; development on new business activities...  
Evolutions happened with the creation of intermediate structures to support the 
executive board. A first one was the BU's manager meeting and the second one was 
the meeting of the directors of expertise groups. Moreover the logic and the content 
of the platform voted at the same time as the election of the board managers was 
rethought. It was no longer considered as a precise program but more a roadmap. It 
distinguished between issues which were clarified with solutions to implement or to 
manage and issues which were to investigate. The representation of the latter was 
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important to help sustaining executive functions. They were no longer under the 
criticisms and fierce debates on blurry topics. They could organize additional support 
groups to explore and to organize learning on the issue.  
 
Since the end of the research, DemEx has reinforced its democratic identity in 
adopting a co-operative form in 2011. The development of the firm has continued, 
partly through internationalization, since three subsidiaries opened in other European 
countries.  
  
4. Discussion 
Regeneration processes as designing new models of cooperation 
Contradictions (Varman and Chakrabarti 2004), tensions (Hernandez 2006), 
paradoxes (Westenholz 1999), conflicting institutional logics (Battilana and Dorado 
2010; Pache and Santos 2010) generate difficulties in the management of alternative 
organizations. The outcomes are described as processes either of degeneration, or 
"hybridization", or permanent tension.  
DemEx is confronted to similar antagonist pressures and dichotomies. A striking 
example is the debate on the existence of expertise groups. The birth of new 
structures and new roles of expert in the organization are very disputed and the 
rationales convey two different legitimacy. On the one hand, some argued on a 
professional competency basis that such structures were necessary to the survival of 
the firm in order to propose high quality services. On the other hand, other argued on 
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a democratic argument, that emerging structures had no democratic regulation since 
their activities were blurry for group's outsiders and there were no elected positions. 
But the development of these groups followed a pattern, which can be interpreted in 
a different way. Rather than responding to external institutional logics (Friedland and 
Alford 1991), DemEx had a mix of clients-driven incentive and member's commitment 
to democratic functioning. In this context, the issues, and the degeneration slope 
were on the possible impossibility to combine both demands.  
The intervention research produced a framework which helped designing and 
adapting such expertise groups to the democratic setting of DemEx while re-inforcing 
their legitimacy and their means in the firm. The functional framework was in that 
sense a mean to represent the relation of expertise groups to the firm's "common 
good". Production of expertise is linked to either Commercial development or to 
Internal knowledge management, i.e. ways to transfer and provide expertise to 
members who are non-experts in the field and to contribute to the overall advance of 
the firm. It helped to re-think the division of labor, as the former autonomous 
professional was now embedded in a more collective service production. Expert roles 
were acknowledged and they could intervene as support to specific issues on 
assignments and they could work besides clients' assignments to develop synthses 
or surveys. It went along with a clarification of rights and duties between expertise 
groups and management, as they should explained their strategy and the means to 
implement. This rather classical evolution of professional service firms (Abbott 1988; 
Tolbert and Barley 1991) was possible while fitting in a democratic setting. The 
election of expertise groups' directors was not held in due to the importance of 
competency legitimacy on the expertise issues. The democratic embodiment was 
mainly twofold: in the move towards transparency through regular reporting and 
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strategic exchanges and in a system of rights and duties between group's members 
and the rest of the firm. This was a move towards an enhancement of representative 
democracy (through the board of managers), which is inevitable due to size and 
information costs.  
This process of regeneration appears to be different from the treatment of conflicting 
issues as a degeneration process or as a compromise process. In this case, there is 
an outcome through the design of a new model of cooperation. The term cooperation 
refers to volunteer collective action. We refer to the work of Barnard (Barnard 1968 
(1938)). He defined a formal system of organization as the dynamic adaptation of 
three elements: the will to cooperate, a common purpose and means to cooperate 
(structure, communication, management tools). The cooperation continues when the 
action is efficient and when members are satisfied. In the case of DemEx, the 
regeneration process relied on the production and the implementation of a renewed 
model of cooperation. It suggests that next to processes of hybridization or 
submission of one goal to another, a third logic of evolution exists. Conflicting logics 
have been treated by another historical management scholar, Follett, who 
distinguished between three outcomes to such dichotomies (Follett 1924). The first 
one is the "domination" of one logic on another and the second one is the 
"compromise". In both cases, the conflict is not resolved and reappears sooner or 
later. The third one is labeled "integration": in this case, conflicting points of view are 
confronted in order to share knowledge. The aim is to generate a new situation, 
through the integration process, which can satisfy both sides. Conflicts may 
reemerge, but they will not be in the same form.  
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Then a process of regeneration through the design of a new model of cooperation 
appears to be a third possible outcome of degeneration crises, next to degeneration 
and compromise processes.  
It goes along with a conception of organizational democracy as a purpose to embody 
in the organization, which is not existing independently of the work settings, the 
environment constraints and the actors' will. As a consequence, democracy is not an 
achievement in itself but a component of a collective purpose, which also 
encompasses organizational efficiency (Reynaud 1997). In the case of DemEx, the 
new model of cooperation created more links and solidarity between members. The 
original model made jointly liable few issues, since expertise developments, the 
organization of work, and the pay system were mainly designed for autonomous 
individuals. The new model emphasizes collective production and work through the 
development of investment policies or the existence of expertise groups for example. 
 
Managerial implication  
Crises of degeneration are unavoidable in the course of democratic firms (Stryjan 
1984). The issue is to be able to manage regeneration processes. The intervention 
researches helped DemEx to frame issues and then to design and experiment 
renewed organizational perspectives. DemEx also adapted progressively its 
governance, especially by differentiating two mandates, which are given to board 
managers through the platform. The first one is a mandate of implementation when 
issues and management directions are clarified; the second one is a mandate of 
inquiry when issues are blurry and contested with the aim of investigating first. These 
two regimes of executive action help framing the nature and the place of debates and 
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the aim of the managerial action on a topic. Collective learning processes are of 
primary importance because they help building consensus among members. Voting 
is also a factor of division when results are close. A long investigation leading to a 
large consensus paves the way to a rapid implementation. The evaluation of 
democratic time-consumption appears more exact when including the outcome of the 
process and the implementation.  
 
Conclusion and further research 
The aim of this paper was to further examine the processes of regeneration in 
democratic firms. In line with previous research, our goal was not to contest the 
existence and threat of degeneration phases related to these organizations, but to 
contest the deterministic view on the degeneration processes and suggest ways in 
which to understand and sustain regeneration processes.   
Our findings provide an empirically-based account of a different pattern of 
regeneration. They shed light on the design of a new model of cooperation, 
understood as new ways of organizing and embodying democracy in it, as an original 
outcome to degeneration crises. This dynamic of cooperation can neither be 
restricted to a natural evolving phenomenon, nor to the making of compromises 
between antagonistic logics within the firm. The understanding of this dynamic is thus 
of paramount importance when studying regeneration processes since it is 
fundamental to the development of sustainable democratic firms. 
Finally, by characterizing the elaboration of new models of cooperation as an 
“integration process” (Follett) that can be collectively conducted, the paper provides 
actionable knowledge on the way in which to foster regeneration processes.  
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Caution in the application of the analysis to other kinds of alternative organizations 
should be taken. In a democratic firm governed by its members the number of 
stakeholders remain limited compared to a non-governmental organization (NGO). It 
may then be easier to engage in "integration processes".  
Further research could deepen the logic theorized from the case-study by looking at 
cases showing similar patterns.  
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